Taking distance from previous studies where naval warfare in Classical period is considered as an Athenian uniqueness concerning her military results, this paper aims to review the battles which took place during the Peloponnesian War from a different perspective. After a brief analysis of the Athenian military tactics, understood as their specificity difficult to implement unconditionally, we try to shed light on the Others opted for their ways to conduct naval warfare.

This chapter explores the classical Greek texts that lay the conceptual foundation for the Greek notions of sea power. I argue that for the Greek authors, sea power embodies broader principles of expansionism and mobility, which are bound to threaten the stability of the existing political order and lead to either a catastrophic subversion of it or the creation of a new utopian arrangement. At their core, the Greek notions of sea power mediate between a profound transformation of the political sphere and a conspicuous challenge to the good life of citizens.

Despite the rich scholarly studies about Greek warfare, not much has been written about what could be defined Greek “unconventional warfare”, especially regarding the period between the 8th and the 5th century BC. Most of the modern scholars, in fact, have been focusing on the reconstruction of the various phases of a typical battle, or have considered the strategies and tactics used at the expense of a deeper study of the actual fighting dynamics. Ultimately, this means that almost nobody has tried to relate battle patterns and their theoretical aspects, as if they were completely unrelated to each other, and investigate why some parts of Greece were more receptive to military innovation than others. This dissertation aims to solve this issue, and includes: a few considerations about unconventional warfare, as it has been defined in modern times, and an adaptation of its definition that may be applied to Greek warfare; a brief description of the various troops that composed a typical 5th century BC polis’ army, and of their role in battle; the analysis of some significant episodes of the Peloponnesian War, where the strategies and tactics applied by the commanders stand out for their innovative approach. Lastly, some considerations on how in reality these unconventional strategies and tactics are not relegated to the Peloponnesian War only: in fact, they can be found in other past conflicts. This may lead to the supposition that they are part of a diachronic military evolution, whose roots date back at least to the Homeric Poems, and whose evidence is sometimes hidden by predominant tradition of hoplite warfare.

Sparta has long enjoyed the reputation of a polis that was hostile toward and incompetent in τὰ ναυτικά. Impediments, including its location and agrarian economic base, made it difficult for Sparta to challenge Athenian sea power before the last decade of the fifth century. Herodotus and Thucydides, moreover, repeatedly offer support for the Athenian-based stereotype of the Lacedaemonian “landlubber”. Both authors, however, provide accounts of Spartan naval activity that question the assumption that the Spartans were “at sea” when it came to naval matters.

Theoretical analysis of the war of ancient eras is as important as that of the modern and postmodern eras. Analysis of the primal, primitive, primordial and prehistoric wars shows that, by and large, they were driven by the same motives. The wars of the Hellenistic and the Greek era, too, have been as comparable. The Peloponnesian war fought from 431 BC to 404 BC between two main alliances of the Greek era-the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, and the Delian League, led by Athens-provides a lot for great analysis. It gives insight not only into the political affairs of the Greek era, but also an invaluable case study for the policymakers and theoreticians for drawing pertinent lessons for today's international, regional and national environments. Theoretical analysis of the Peloponnesian War provides for study of the war in the light of a host of theories. However, as Thucydides upholds, the war in question was a mirror image of honour, interest and fear as a motive, and thus...

Several, if not many, scholars and historians have written about the exploits of the Athenian Navy during the 5th century BC, especially, during the Persian Wars, (480-479) the pentekontaetia period (478-432) through to the Peloponnesian War period (431-404), until the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami (405 BC). This interest in the Athenian Navy and its achievements in the Classical period has led to the writing of several specialist works on that phenomenon; and we note that no general work on Greek history is deemed complete without an excursus on the Athenian Navy and how it helped save Greece from the tyranny of Persia. Our intention in this paper is not to trod the same path and recount the exploits of the Athenian navy, but rather to attempt to account for the transformation of the Athenian navy from a minnow to a leviathan within a twenty year period. We shall, through a critical examination of extant primary sources, primarily Herodotus and, to a lesser extent, Plutarch, argue, firstly, that in terms of naval strength and sea power, Athens was a minnow as at 499 BC, and secondly that it was through a recognition of this deficiency and at the urging of Themistocles that Athens commissioned a fleet to bolster its sea power and naval strength, and thus became a leviathan as at 480 BC when the Persian Wars broke out in earnest in main land Greece. Keywords: minnow, leviathan, pentekonter, trireme, Themistocles, Persian Wars, Athenian Navy